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Abstract
Clinical ethics consultation (CEC), as an activity that may be provided by clinical ethics committees and consultants,
is nowadays a well-established practice in North America. Although it has been increasingly implemented in Europe
and elsewhere, no agreement can be found among scholars and practitioners on the appropriate role or approach
the consultant should play when ethically problematic cases involving conflicts and uncertainties come up. In particular,
there is no consensus on the acceptability of consultants making recommendations, offering moral advice upon request,
and expressing personal opinions. We translate these issues into the question of whether the consultant should be
neutral when performing an ethics consultation. We argue that the notion of neutrality 1) functions as a hermeneutical
key to review the history of CEC as a whole; 2) may be enlightened by a precise assessment of the nature and goals of
CEC; 3) refers to the normative dimension of CEC. Here, we distinguish four different meanings of neutrality: a neutral
stance toward the parties involved in clinical decision making, toward the arguments offered to frame the discussion,
toward the values and norms involved in the case, and toward the outcome of decision making, that is to say the final
decision and action that will be implemented. Lastly, we suggest a non-authoritarian way to intend the term
“recommendation” in the context of clinical ethics consultation.
Keywords: Clinical ethics, Neutrality, Professionalism, Role, Ethics expertise, Decision-making
Background
The question of neutrality in clinical ethics consultation
(CEC) has accompanied the international debate from
its very beginning, even though it has rarely been expli-
citly addressed. This question has existed since the
origin of clinical ethics and has persisted with its devel-
oping presence in the clinical sphere through the formal
establishment of clinical ethics committees. Initially,
clinical ethics committees were endorsed by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in the context of Karen Quinlan’s
case (1976), later by the President’s Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
and Behavioral Research (1983), as well as by several
other public and professional bodies. According to the
President’s Commission in 1983, the committees were
supposed to perform ethical case review offering “non-
binding advisory recommendation” ([1], p. 440). While
committees have been primarily created to support the
decision-making process of healthcare professionals, the
task of individual consultation has always been the most
controversial task of clinical ethics committees. Some
scholars wanted to frame CEC in a more modest way as
simply a discussion, while others even argued in favor of
stopping individual consultation altogether and focusing
on education and policy development.
Clinicians often voiced concerns about the supposed
moral authority of a committee consisting of various ex-
perts. Any kind of ethics case consultation carried out
by persons external to the clinical team was sometimes
regarded as a risky intrusion that could jeopardize the
close doctor-patient dyad and undermine the decision-
making authority as well as the responsibility of the
health care professionals [2]. In fact, according to
Fleetwood et al., the ethics committee was expected
to function in a way consistent with a clinical con-
sultation model and to provide moral advice, recom-
mendations or “right answers” [3].
These high expectations have become more and more
controversial as the limits of the full-committee ap-
proach to CEC have led to the gradual appearance of
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small committee units and single ethics consultants act-
ing directly at the bedside. The skepticism about the
consulting activity was evidenced, from the very begin-
ning, by the vague expressions used to designate it. As
an example, CEC was referred to using several words,
such as “consultation”, “case review”, “counseling”, or
“case discussion” ([4], p. 22). Except for “consultation”,
which has a clear meaning, i.e. providing advice, the
other terms suggest a less demanding task which in no
way indicates the right thing to do. We want to show
that there are good philosophical reasons to believe
that the ethical deliberation, which may even include
advice or suggestions, is different from the final deci-
sion or action.
Different models of ethics consultation
It has been claimed that there are at least two big cat-
egories under which ethics consultation may be classi-
fied, namely the so called “soft” and “hard” models for
ethics consultation [5]. These two categories differently
conceptualize the extent to which the ethics consultant
should be involved in decision-making regarding patient
care. Generally speaking, in the first category the ethics
consultant may act as a facilitator or a mediator, facilitat-
ing the discussion among the involved actors, clarifying
their moral positions, exploring options and mediating
conflict to reach a solution. The second category, to the
contrary, resembles more the clinical model of consult-
ation, and the ethics consultant acts as a clinical profes-
sional who possesses a specific expertise and makes
substantive recommendations on the ethically best
course of treatment. It has been pointed out that the
main difference between the two models is the presence
of a rendered recommendation [6].
There is no consensus on how acceptable it is for the
consultant to provide substantive recommendations re-
garding patient care. Reviewing the two editions of the
American Society for Bioethics and the Humanities
(ASBH) reports on Core Competencies for Healthcare
Ethics Consultation, there are at least some claims that
must be taken into consideration [7, 8]. In the first edi-
tion of the report (1998), after having outlined a clinical
case in which more than one option was considered eth-
ically feasible, the authors permitted consultants to ex-
press personal moral judgements, but expected them to
justify and designate them as personal opinions. In the
second edition of the report (2011), consultants are cau-
tioned about recommending a particular course of ac-
tion when more than one is ethically justified; according
to the authors, this would qualify as unacceptably au-
thoritarian. Yet, the authors also state that when the par-
ties contemplate a certain decision or action that is
clearly regarded as unethical by the consultant, the latter
should recommend against it. When just one of the
identified courses of action is ethically appropriate, she
should state why others are not. Besides, the consultant
is allowed to provide “process” recommendations, e.g.
she can suggest involving more people in the discus-
sion, or point out that the patient’s decisional capacity
needs to be assessed. In any case, both the first and
the second edition state that the consultant is com-
mitted to helping the parties identify a range of ethic-
ally permissible options.
Many scholars and practitioners in the field have dis-
missed the practice of expressing recommendations, lim-
iting the role of the consultant to the identification of
possible options. Once the options are identified as mor-
ally acceptable, so they contend, it is not the consultant’s
business to tell the parties what the right action is or
how they should decide [9].
It has also been argued that specific ethically trouble-
some cases require the consultant to play a more active
and substantial role to help resolve conflicts and di-
lemmas. The cases defined as “unsettled”, i.e. cases for
which clear ethical and professional standards of reso-
lution cannot be found, seem to allow the consultant to
go beyond the strictly detached role of a neutral medi-
ator [10]. When it is not possible to identify unambigu-
ous points of reference to assess whether an option is
ethically acceptable, the consultant may explore what is
ethically permissible, but in the end she is not allowed
to recommend it [11, 12]. Others argue for a flexible role
of the consultant, moving between neutral moderation,
analysis, clear advice and even advocating or insisting on
certain normative aspects [13]. Health care profes-
sionals might be more or less willing to take advice
from the ethics consultant and sometimes clearly ask
for such guidance in order to make better informed
decisions [14, 15].
Empirical data show that the practice of issuing rec-
ommendations is quite common among CEC services in
the United States [16]. However, it seems that there is
no clear and unambiguous understanding of the term
“recommendation”: it may indicate either telling the par-
ties what should be put into practice or just uncovering
feasible options ([8], p. 38, note 89). In short, such het-
erogeneity in theory and practice requires further inves-
tigation into the normative dimension of ethics
consultation as well as a clear understanding of the role
that the consultant is expected to play [16].
In any case, to tell persons who are asking for an eth-
ics consult what should or should not be done is consid-
ered unjustified for reasons directly referring to the issue
of ethics expertise. Ethics expertise raises both concep-
tual and moral concerns [17]. Firstly, expertise in ethics
is often regarded as a fiction by those who think that
there is no real, certain and unequivocal knowledge at-
tainable in ethics. Indeed, normative ethics is an
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endeavor that cannot be based solely on empirical evi-
dence or fundamental moral claims that are universally
accepted. Since ethics is not a discipline that provides
objective knowledge, this makes any claim to the usual
form of expertise simply inconsistent. The idea of ethics
expertise raises criticisms even from a moral perspective:
the belief that someone has a better insight into right
and wrong seems inconsistent with contemporary moral
pluralism and with the tenet of autonomy in decision-
making. People may hold well-justified but divergent
personal opinions about what is right and what is wrong
and no one is in a privileged position as to be able to ad-
judicate on these opinions. For the reasons mentioned
above, several authors favor a cautious role for the ethics
consultant so as not to risk authoritarianism and in
order to be respectful of today’s moral pluralism. Hence,
facilitation and mediation have often been endorsed as
the best approaches to ethics consultation [18].
Ethics expertise
The issue of expertise in ethics would deserve a pro-
found discussion in a separate article. As Lisa Rasmussen
rightly summarizes, “Not only do authors disagree on
whether ethics expertise exists, they disagree on what it is”
([19], p. 2). Here, we can only present some thoughts
about ethics expertise for clinical ethics consultants, dis-
tinguishing between three levels of expertise.
We consider the clinical ethics consultant as an ex-
pert, even though we assume there are at least three
main senses in which ethics expertise may be intended
and these three senses are subject to growing moral
complexity. The first, which we would call the “unprob-
lematic” meaning of ethics expertise, consists in a good
knowledge of ethical theories, concepts, principles and
arguments, relevant bioethics and clinical ethics litera-
ture, guidelines, professional standards of practice, and a
basic knowledge of the relevant law. The second, which
we would call normative expertise, is more controversial
and has to do with the ability to analyze ethical quandar-
ies, find plausible solutions and justify with convincing
arguments why a proposed solution is morally good or
at least better than the alternatives. This is the meaning
of ethics expertise which raises the most criticism, par-
ticularly if one takes into account the disagreement on
the meta-ethical level, the lack of a unanimous definition
of right and good, and the obvious reality of a highly
pluralistic society [17].
The third meaning of ethics expertise is even more
controversial and refers to practical wisdom as a virtue.
Including also the evaluative dimension of how to lead a
good life. This expertise does not express a mere cogni-
tive knowledge of the good, but a kind of identification
of the self with the knowledge possessed: this practical
wisdom implies acting virtuously as second nature.
Whether this last meaning is applicable to the ethics
consultant would require further in-depth reflection and
strong justification. It has already been noted how con-
troversial the use of “character” and “virtue” is in the
ethics consultant’s description, considering the lack of
a shared definition of the good in our contemporary
society [20]. However, as Sidney Callahan put it, a
certainly relevant question for ethics consultation is:
“Must you be morally wise and good to do bioethics
well?” ([21], p. 24).
Within the limits of this contribution we argue for the
first and second meaning of ethics expertise. In our un-
derstanding, the consultant should possess specific
knowledge that we identify with what Stephen Wear
calls the “canon of clinical ethics” [22]. That is a set of
shared principles, rules, norms and guidelines that
should govern the activity of ethics consultation and de-
fine its boundaries. Moreover, the consultant should also
address and attempt to answer the core question of nor-
mative ethics in clinical settings, namely, what the best
justified decision is in a specific situation for a particular
patient [15].
Clinical ethics as a normative activity
We argue that the interpretation of the role of the ethics
consultant as a simple facilitator or mediator leaves it
quite impoverished. Even though it has been largely ex-
plained that mediation pays great attention both to
“good process” and to “good outcomes”, namely, out-
comes consistent with ethical and legal standards, we
suggest that clinical ethics has to adopt a normative role
for the consultant. In other words, we argue that the
clinical ethics consultant has to play a normative
enriched role and not just a role of mediation. At the
same time, this forces us to answer the question whether
the consultant should be neutral. We conceive the clin-
ical ethics consultant not as a neutral mediator or facili-
tator, but as a real health care professional with her own
moral responsibilities. In doing so we defend the thesis
that the definition of clinical ethics has inherent norma-
tive content with relation to the role of the ethics con-
sultant. Furthermore, we support a non-authoritarian
interpretation of the term “recommendation”, which is
better understood as “advice”, that is to say, the appro-
priate involvement or attentive participation of the ethics
consultant in the human, ethical and psychological di-
mension of the case discussed.
For our purposes it is helpful to compare the goals of
medicine with the goals of clinical ethics. Clinical ethics
shares with medicine a morally-oriented nature aimed at
fostering the good of the patient as well as at improving
health care assistance. Clinical ethics focuses on good
ethical decision-making which should lead to medic-
ally and morally appropriate care outcomes [23, 24].
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Therefore, there is a clear parallel and even a neces-
sary connection between the goals of medical care
and the goals of ethics consultation. By acknowledg-
ing that the clinical ethics consultant has professional
attitudes and moral responsibilities that are comparable to
those of physicians and other health care professionals, we
have already partially rejected the notion of neutrality as
the feature that should guide the activity of the ethics con-
sultant. If speaking about ethics consultation necessitates
reflecting upon the values and norms that should inform
and guide the ethically best decision in patient care, then
dealing with the question of neutrality means to address
the question of normativity in CEC. We will distinguish
four different specifications of the term neutrality when it
is applied to the process of ethics consultation. In particu-
lar, we analyze what neutrality means with regard to (a)
the parties involved in the consultation process, including
the ethics consultant herself; (b) the arguments offered by
the consultant to frame the discussion; (c) the values and
norms involved in the case at hand; and (d) the outcome,
that is to say the final decision or action that will be im-
plemented. This distinction reflects in part the analysis of
“impartiality” in bioethics mediation and ethics consult-
ation made by David Perlman [25].
(a) With regard to the parties participating in the eth-
ics discussion, neutrality is conceived as “impartiality”
[25] or “fairness”. This means behaving in a respectful
way towards the various interests, preferences and values
of the participants, giving them the chance to be equally
heard and considered. According to this philosophy,
each point of view deserves respect and moral consider-
ation. This is well explained by the ASBH when they
state that, in order to “facilitate the building of a prin-
cipled ethical resolution, the ethics consultant must
ensure that involved parties (e.g., patients, families, sur-
rogates, healthcare professionals) have their voices
heard” ([8], p. 8). Nevertheless, assuming a clinical con-
sultation model for ethics consultation means to us that
the consultant’s primary responsibility is to protect and
help realize the good of the patient. Put another way, the
consultant should ascertain whether the parties involved
(physicians, nurses, relatives) are really acting for the
good of the patient or whether, on the contrary, they are
pursuing personal interests.
Concerning the notion of neutrality when applied to
the person of the ethics consultant, we emphasize that
the clinical ethics consultant is as much a moral agent
as anyone else involved in the consultation. According
to the Code of Ethics for Health Care Ethics Consultants,
consultants are cautioned about potential conflicts be-
tween personal and professional integrity [26]. Personal
integrity is defined as acting in a manner consistent with
personal moral values, whereas professional integrity
means acting in a manner consistent with professional
values aligned with shared ethical standards. When con-
sultants personally have moral objections against certain
practices, such as artificial reproductive technologies, they
should try to refer the case to a colleague. If this is not
possible and there is a clear conflict of interest between
personal integrity and professional integrity, the Code ar-
gues that professional integrity should be preserved.
As Walter Edinger rightly pointed out, there may be
cases in which consultants might feel morally obligated
to speak up, feeling that it would be unsatisfactory just
to tell parties the prevailing consensus position and to
hide behind a veil of silence with respect to their moral
positions. Sometimes the consultant’s opinion can di-
verge from the consensus position. In such cases, giving
also one’s own opinion would mean to behave with
“moral responsibility” and “conviction” ([27], p. 26). In
other circumstances, there may be several ethically well-
founded courses of action. In such cases, the consultant
may enrich the deliberation by explaining her personal
opinion and making it available for further discussion.
Of course the consultant, as the other parties, should
pursue an unselfish interest in the consultation: she
should act for the patient’s good.
(b) The second meaning of neutrality is “objectivity”
or “transparency” in the arguments that the consultant
may offer. It refers to the ability to offer well-built justifi-
cations for ethical claims, to provide rigorous reasons
and conclusive arguments in light of ethical standards,
institutional policies, literature, precedent cases and em-
pirical evidence. Before being “objective” and “transpar-
ent” in relation to the arguments, the consultant must
be competent and well-informed. We apply “objectivity”
and “transparency” also to the consultant’s personal
moral point of view: as already stated, we believe that
the consultant is allowed (and sometimes even required)
to disclose her moral convictions making sure to under-
line that they are her own.
The third (c) and the fourth (d) meanings of neutrality
are closely linked. When applied to the values and
norms involved in an ethics consultation and to out-
comes of the consultation, we reject neutrality if it is
conceived of as moral indifference. Moral indifference
follows from a meta-ethical position which denies that
human reason is equipped to find any substantial and
shared indication about what is morally good or ethically
obligatory. If there is no possibility for human reason to
grasp any certain normative content that inspires moral
conduct, there is no yardstick for assessing good inten-
tions, actions, and outcomes. This meta-ethical topic
cannot be fully covered here and falls outside the scope
of this contribution. However, it is sufficient to recall
that even though the ASBH reports on Core Competen-
cies do not (and maybe cannot) enter the philosophical
question about the sources of human morality, they
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abundantly adopt expressions like “morally/ethically ac-
ceptable”, which generally refer to shared ethical, social
and legal standards. Even if there is no clear official
standard or definition on what is “ethical”, i.e. “morally
good”, the possibility of realizing good outcomes or a
“principled ethical resolution” (as it is called in the sec-
ond edition) is never rejected. As Perlman states, “the
ethics consultants cannot be impartial to the outcome or
to the norms used to reach that outcome” [25]. In the
ASBH reports we recognize a reference to basic com-
mon moral rules or criteria that should orient the ethical
deliberation towards good choices. This is true even if it
is acknowledged that moral pluralism governs the moral
life of individuals, now more than ever.
To sum up, in ethics consultation we do not regard as
morally indifferent which precise norms or principles
are worth protecting and promoting. Sometimes what is
needed is a complex moral assessment of the goodness
of actions, ends, values and principles considered in the
ethical deliberation. Of course this may be done accord-
ing to some meta-ethical criteria, such as a moral per-
spective that considers the character of the moral agent,
the nature of the moral act, its consequences and the re-
lated contextual factors [28]. This is the main contribu-
tion the consultant may bring to good ethical outcomes
in patient care.
The moral value of advising
We think there is a difference between the process of
“ethical deliberation”, which comes beforehand (and may
even include recommendations or advice), and the clin-
ical decision or action, which follows and may be the re-
sult of the ethical deliberation. To recommend does not
mean to order, to decide, to act, to make moral decisions
on behalf of others or to impose moral beliefs. To rec-
ommend actions, options or solutions in CEC has largely
been misunderstood as undermining the authority of the
morally appropriate decision makers or threatening to-
day’s moral pluralism. We would like to rehabilitate the
idea of recommendation and to put aside the most con-
troversial aspects of its definition. The term “recommen-
dation” is largely adopted in the clinical sphere by
physicians who are acting as clinical consultants. They
are right to “recommend” because they are supposed to
know what is right to do to restore health and to recover
from illness. It raises suspicion when it is used in the
field of CEC, because in ethics there is no comparable
scientific evidence to prove the superiority of certain
recommendations over others. Since the term “recom-
mendation” has the unfortunate connotation of impos-
ing one’s own view on others, we think rather that
“advice” has the merit of invoking a partnership in the
ethical deliberation [29].
The term “advice” corresponds to the ancient Greek
word “symboule”, which means “deliberation” (boule)
“with” or “together” (sym). As Antonio Da Re points out
[29], in the Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics
(1112b10–11) Aristotle wrote: “We call in others to aid
us in deliberation on important questions, distrusting
ourselves as not being equal to deciding” ([30], p. 1756).
In the original Greek version, Aristotle uses the term
“symboulous” for people (i.e. counselors, advisors) who
may help us in deciding on important questions when
we think we are not able to discern it well enough our-
selves [29]. Here, the advisor is a sort of partner in the
deliberation process and helps to realize a joint deliber-
ation (“deliberating with or together”). We think this
might offer an interpretation of the role of the ethics
consultant that highlights her expertise as someone
trustworthy and helpful when decisions have to be taken
and the decision-makers are not certain about what is
ethically the most appropriate action or solution.
We argue that the ethics consultant is allowed to ex-
press her personal moral opinion as stated previously.
There may be circumstances in which more than one
ethically justifiable option is available in a given case, so
that the consultant may want to expand the discussion
offering her own insight; in other circumstances, she
may even disagree with the consensus view [27], and
then it is a matter of integrity to give voice to one’s own
opinion. However, the consultant should pay attention
to clearly state that the opinion is her own. In other situ-
ations, the appropriate role of the consultant may be just
to clarify and analyze ethical issues or facilitate under-
standing and agreement among persons. Therefore, it
often depends on what the consultant is asked to do or
what the situation requires.
We do not contend that the consultant has to know
what is good for the patient in absolute terms. The good
of the patient is a very complex notion and should be
understood taking into account different facts and di-
mensions. However, in our view, the ethics consultant
has the same moral responsibilities as physicians or
other health care professionals, i.e. she should act in a
way that promotes the wellbeing of the patient both in a
medical and a moral sense. What we want to underline
is the idea that the consultant does not provide recom-
mendations or advice irrespective of the other parties in-
volved (patient, health professionals, family members
and others). The advice offered should be considered the
result of a joint moral assessment of the situation, taking
into full account the clinical facts, the patient’s moral
convictions and life story, and other relevant perspec-
tives. As Sulmasy put it: “[…] the consultant cannot
claim a monopoly on moral truth and make the deci-
sions alone. Rather, the consult should facilitate a discus-
sion designed to lead to the best answer, however
Gasparetto et al. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine  (2018) 13:3 Page 5 of 7
imperfectly” ([24], p. 102). In this sense, the consultant’s
advice is not “absolute”, i.e. ab-solutus, that is to say,
loosened from the context and the narrative dimension
of the given case.
As stated above, the consultant should not be consid-
ered an external party detached from the ethical dimen-
sion of the case under consideration, but a health care
professional involved in patient care. Moreover, even if
the “fact” of moral pluralism is acknowledged, this does
not relieve us of the task of assessing the acceptability of
different moral convictions and perspectives.
Conclusions
We have argued that the question of neutrality has been
a vexing and often implicit question throughout the his-
tory of ethics consultation. In particular, it has to do
with the fear that consultants may feel tempted to im-
pose their personal beliefs on others and curtail the pro-
fessional liberty of physicians and other health care
providers. This has led ethics consultants to favor less
controversial roles and tasks, such as facilitation, medi-
ation, case discussion or analysis. Yet, as we have shown,
clinical ethics consultation and clinical care ultimately
pursue the same goal and thus have to be guided by the
same attitudes. This insight supports an engaged, nor-
matively laden role and responsibility for the ethics con-
sultant. We have distinguished different meanings of the
term neutrality with regard to four different elements of
the consultation process: the parties, the arguments, the
values and norms, as well as the outcome of the consult-
ation process. The practice of making recommendations,
which usually is the final step in a consultation, should
be seen as a way to help parties to identify the ethically
best justified course of action and not as a way to im-
pose a supposed predetermined moral truth, based on
the subjective consultant’s point of view. We have pro-
posed a non-authoritarian way to interpret the term
“recommendation” as advice, taking a cue from the
Greek philosopher Aristotle. The clinical decision
makers, the patient, and the patient’s relatives remain
free to accept or reject the recommendation or advice as
agents responsible for their actions. In fact, the term
“advice” already implies an appeal to a person’s reason-
ing capacities rather than manipulation or coercion to
decide or act in a certain way.
Abbreviation
CEC: Clinical Ethics Consultation
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